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Abstract 
Nel seguente elaborato si presenta un’analisi del microcredito allo scopo di comprendere il 
ruolo della commercializzazione e dell’originaria missione sociale nel futuro del settore. Lo 
studio si basa su di un campione di 346 istituzioni microfinanziarie e rivela profonde 
differenze tra le organizzazioni a scopo di lucro e non: le prime hanno una profittabilità in 
media superiore, effettuano prestiti dal valore più elevato e, quindi, hanno costi e tassi di 
interesse inferiori; le seconde, invece, utilizzano più sussidi, ma riescono a raggiungere un 
numero maggiore di donne e di persone bisognose. Oltre la metà delle istituzioni che persegue 
obiettivi unicamente sociali riesce ugualmente a coprire i costi. Il business sociale nel 
microcredito, quindi, non sembra destinato ad essere superato da quello meramente 
commerciale: al contrario, la missione sociale del microfinanziamento, iniziata con Yunus e 
concretizzata nella Grameen Bank e in tutti i successivi progetti nei vari Paesi del mondo, 
sembra portare i suoi frutti in termini di miglioramento delle condizioni di vita delle persone 
maggiormente disagiate. Il modello dell’impresa con obiettivi sociali è, infatti, estremamente 
moderno e di ampia applicabilità; l’impresa sociale è al giorno d’oggi una grande opportunità 
sia per i paesi in via di sviluppo che per quelli sviluppati. 
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Introduction. Microfinance as a poverty reduction tool: should it be profitable?  
The term “microfinance” refers to a range of financial services (primarily, loans) offered to 
low-income and non-bankable customers: making use of self-help resources, it aims at 
releasing the productivity of cash-starved small entrepreneurs, while raising their incomes 
above poverty lines. In this way microfinance can let poor people develop basic financial 
capabilities (deal with emergencies, handle cash flows and invest for the future) and it could 
play an important role in breaking gender-based barriers, empowering women through 
financial independence.  
Microfinance began its evolution at the start of the 1970s, thanks to great minds such 
as Muhammad Yunus, with a particular focus on poor farmers in developing countries. This 
first attempt was not successful: agricultural lending was too risky (because of agriculture 
vulnerability to the unpredictable changes of weather and crop prices) and the incentives of 
institutions were misaligned; as a consequence, the first microfinance institutions were costly 
and inefficient. During the 1980s, the focus shifted: microfinance pioneers began addressing 
people in villages running small enterprises (e.g. making handicrafts, livestock raising). 
Although no collateral or credit history was asked, repayment rates were really high. This 
success created concrete basis for extending access to loans to billions of low-income people 
previously left out from formal financial services.  
With the continuing of the development and growth of the sector, in the 1980s and 
1990s policymakers started arguing that the new microfinance institutions (MFIs) should look 
for profits in order to be “financially sustainable”. The supporters of profit-seeking 
microfinance believe in a “win-win” opportunity: they can give a service to the poor while 
making profits with a little trade-off between the social and commercial objectives. They 
support their convictions with three arguments. First of all, they affirm that access to finance 
is more important than its price: small loans are costly to manage and, consequently, high 
interest rates are charged to poor households; but, since the only other option to have cash is 
given by usurers who charge even higher interest rates, what is offered by profitable MFIs is 
anyway a benefit. Actually, their claim that the existence of moneylenders implies the 
insensitivity of most borrowers to interest rates should not be taken for granted. In fact, 
moneylenders and microfinance answer to different needs: while moneylenders’ loans are 
usually used for very short periods (less than a month) for compelling consumption needs, 
microfinance loans are used for longer periods (at least several months) for business 
investments. Secondly, the supporters of the financially sustainable microfinance state that 
subsidies in nonprofit MFIs can reduce initiatives of innovation and cost cutting: also in this 
case, there is no evidence to support this assertion. Finally, they also argue that only 
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commercialization can let microfinance spread extensively. The problem is that 
commercialized institutions rarely reach the very poor; furthermore, the long-term interest of 
private investors in this sector is in doubt.  
This debate about the “business model” of microfinance has been strongly revived in 
April 2007 thanks to the Banco Compartamos of Mexico (an example of prosperous 
commercialized microfinance institution) Initial Public Offering. The IPO was very 
successful: insiders sold 30% of their holdings and the sale was oversubscribed by 13 times 
(Compartamos was soon worth $1.6 billion). This achievement was due to the extraordinary 
growth the bank experienced between 2000 and 2007 (from 60,000 customers to over 
800,000), the high interest rates (e.g. 94% per year on loans in 2007) and the consequent high 
profits (nearly one quarter of the bank’s interest revenues went to profit). This information 
caused opposite reactions. On the one hand Yunus (the founder of Grameen Bank) and the 
ones who believe in the social mission of microfinance were shocked by the IPO; for them the 
high interest rates and large profits were unacceptable: Compartamos could have reduced 
interest and profit rates and expanded at a slower pace, without subtracting so much money 
from Mexico’s poor citizens. On the other hand, the supporters of a profit-driven model of 
microfinance were in favor of this IPO: in their view, it indicated the freedom of microfinance 
from donor-supported initiatives, substituted by investments from the private sector. 
Moreover, they sustain that, if Compartamos had not achieved high profits, hundreds of 
thousands of poor customers would have been left out of microfinance opportunities, 
remaining with the only option of turning to usurers (as stated before, they consider access to 
finance more important than its price). Anyway, all sides agree on the vastness of the demand 
for reliable financial services and on the help they could give to low-income people.  
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1. A portrait of the microfinance industry: types of institutions and customers 
In their work “Microfinance Meets the Market” (2009), Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch 
realize an analysis of the microfinance industry in order to understand whether for-profit 
could replace nonprofit microfinance institutions. Using a dataset from the Microfinance 
Information Exchange, they analyze the types of institutions (with a particular focus on banks, 
for-profit status, and nongovernmental organizations, not-for-profit status), the interest rates 
they charge, their clients and their risk of insolvency. 
 
1.1 Data used for the analysis of the microfinance industry: limits, strengths and 
robustness 
The dataset used for the analysis of institutions and customers is not publicly available; it is 
taken from the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX), a not-for-profit organization that 
collects data on microfinance institutions and whose goal is to promote information exchange 
in the microfinance industry. The dataset covers 346 institutions with nearly 18 million active 
microfinance borrowers and a total of $25.3 billion in assets (in purchase power parity terms) 
during the period from 2002 to 2004. Outreach and impact data, financial data, audited 
financial statements and general information on specific microfinance institutions are 
included. A problem is given by the lack of direct measure of outreach to the poor. However, 
the dataset includes indicators (e.g. average loan size, fraction of borrowers that are women) 
which are correlated with self-reported measures of household poverty. In this way, it is still 
possible to distinguish between MFIs serving the very poor versus those serving low-income 
people. Although participating institutions have been selected on their ability to deliver 
quality data, participation in the sample is voluntary: so it is not representative of all 
microfinance institutions. As an example, Grameen Bank decided not to participate during 
this period.  
In order to address the limits of the dataset, Cull et al. (2009) make comparisons with the 
parallel work of Gonzalez and Rosenberg (2006); they also analyze MIX data, but merged 
with two broader datasets (the Microcredit Summit Database and a larger database from the 
MIX). For the most part, the comparison shows consistency. On the other hand, an important 
strength of the dataset is its adjustment to account not only for explicit, but also for hidden 
subsidies. MFIs could obtain capital from social investors at a price that is below the market 
interest rate: the difference in interest rates consists in an implicit subsidy. So the adjustment 
is based on estimates of the alternative cost of capital that the MFI would have had to pay if it 
had obtained the capital in the market rather than from social investors. The alternative cost of 
9  
capital must account for the perceived risk of investing in microfinance institutions (the loan 
portfolio could deteriorate and there is no collateral) and the political or exchange rate risk 
that may affect net returns. So, the choice of the alternative cost of capital is determinative; in 
this case, the MIX uses a country’s deposit rate (taken from the International Monetary 
Fund’s database), that is a relatively low cost of capital. As a test of robustness, Cull et al. 
(2009) re-run profit calculations with a higher alternative cost of capital: the prime interest 
rate (the price for capital that banks charge to their most reliable customers, also taken from 
the IMF’s database) incremented by 2% in order to account for the risk of lending to 
microfinance institutions. Predictably, this adjustment increases the value of implicit subsidies 
and reduces profits. 
 
 
1.2 Distribution of microfinance institutions by institutional type 
The sample analyzed represents a various group of MFIs, as shown in Table 1. The most 
important are nongovernmental organizations, nonbank financial institutions and banks (other 
types of institutions included in the sample, but not deeply analyzed, are rural banks and 
credit unions). Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are the majority (45% of 346 
institutions): NGO is any nonprofit, citizen-based group, that functions independently from 
governments. The nonprofit status doesn’t necessarily imply the absence of profits; it means 
that, if revenues are higher than costs, the profits must be re-invested in the organization to 
further social missions and can’t be distributed. Nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs) 
represent 30% of all institutions; they are in a large category which includes both for-profits 
and nonprofits. Banks represent only 10% of the total number of institutions; they have for-
profit status (they can do what they wish with after tax profits).  
Although banks represent a minority in the sample, they account for over half of all 
the assets (mainly loan portfolios) of the institutions of the dataset. NGOs account for only 
21% of total assets, but they serve 9 million clients, half of the total borrowers in the sample. 
Instead banks serve only a quarter of total customers. These figures have an important 
implication: if banks have the majority of assets (they lend in greater volume than others), but 
serve substantially fewer customers, it means that they are doing on average larger loans per 
borrower than NGOs. In addition, NGOs are serving more female borrowers (but only 290 
institutions report on their coverage on women and only 281 on their use of subsidies): they 
serve 8.76 million women, 73% of all the female clients in the sample, against 16% served by 
NBFIs and only 6% served by banks. On the other hand, NGOs are the institutions that are 
absorbing more subsidies: 61% of all the $2.6 billion of subsidized funds used in the sample 
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come from NGOs, while the same percentage (18%) come from banks and NBFIs. NGOs 
have a share of subsidies that is not proportionate to their assets: they use almost $1.6 billion 
of subsidies for $5.3 billion of assets; banks, on the contrary, use less than $0.5 billion of 
subsidies for almost $14 billion of assets. 
 
Table 1. Distribution of microfinance institutions by institutional type 
 % of institutions % of assets 
% of 
borrowers 
% of female 
borrowers 
% of 
subsidized 
funds 
Bank 10 55 25 6 18 
Nongovernmental 
organization 
(NGO) 
45 21 51 73 61 
Nonbank financial 
institution (NBFI) 30 19 17 16 18 
Credit union 10 4 6 4 3 
Rural bank 5 1 1 1 0 
 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Numbers total 
 
346 
institutions 
 
$25.3 
billion 
 
18 million 
 
12 million 
 
$2.6 billion 
(Note: the sample includes 346 institutions. Data on assets are available for 276 institutions; 
on borrowers for 346; on female borrowers for 290 and on subsidized funds for 281) 
Source: Cull et al. (2009) 
 
 
1.3 Interest rate diversity across institutions: the explanation given by cost structure 
The various types of microfinance institutions in the sample also differ for the interest rates 
they charge. The unexpected fact is that NGOs (not-for-profit organizations with an explicit 
social mission) charge higher interest rates than banks (focused on profits): in fact, as shown 
in the first item of Table 2, while the median NGO has a real portfolio yield (average interest 
rate adjusted for inflation) of 25% per year, the median bank charge an average interest rate of 
13%; a quarter of NGOs charge even more than 37%. Why are the highest fees being charged 
by the institutions most focused on social mission? Cost structures explain these patterns.  
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Table 2. Nongovernmental organizations versus nonbank financial institutions and banks 
 Nongovernmental Organizations 
Nonbank 
financial 
Institutions 
Banks 
1) Real portfolio yield 
(%)    
25th 15 12 9 
Median 25 20 13 
75th 37 26 19 
2) Operating cost as a 
percent of loan value    
25th 15 13 7 
Median 26 17 12 
75th 38 24 21 
3) Average loan size as 
a percentage of income 
at 20th percentile 
   
25th 27 71 110 
Median 48 160 224 
75th 135 247 510 
4) Women as a 
percentage of all 
borrowers 
   
25th 63 47 23 
Median 85 66 52 
75th 100 94 58 
5) Portfolio at risk, 30 
days (%)    
25th 0.74 0.91 0.39* 
Median 3.54 2.06 2.43* 
75th 7.59 6.91 5.23* 
    
*Based on fewer than 10 observations 
Source: Cull et al. (2009) 
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Figure 1 shows that, when the value of the average loan size (as a percentage of the 
income at the 20th percentile of the national income distribution) increases, the operating costs 
(as a percentage of the value of the loan portfolio) decreases. Cull et al. (2009) underline how 
this result doesn’t change after controlling for institutions’ age, inflation, country-level 
governance, GDP growth, region and lending method. 
 
Figure 1. Average costs per dollar lent falls as loans get larger 
Source: Cull et al. (2009) 
 
Operating costs are the ones that make the difference in total costs among various 
MFIs. Moreover, broadening the customer base brings no economies of scale: Gonzales 
(2007) finds that returns of scale disappear after reaching about 2,000 customers.  
We already demonstrated that banks make larger loans than NGOs: these larger loans 
translate into lower costs per dollar lent, as seen in the second item of Table 2. The median 
NGO has an operating cost that represents 26% of the value of the loan (26 cents per dollar 
lent), while for the median bank it’s less than half (12 cents per dollar lent). The median NBFI 
has a cost of 17 cents per dollar lent. So, although NGOs try to keep costs down (even giving 
lower quality services), they can’t recoup the diseconomies of transacting small loans: this is 
the reason why they charge higher interest rates. 
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1.4 Customers served by different types of microfinance institutions 
Customers of NGOs, banks and NBFIs are analyzed based on their income and the percentage 
of women. Cull et al. (2009) assume the loan size as a proxy for the poverty of customers (the 
poorer the customer the smaller the loan). As an evidence of the link between the loan size 
and the borrowers’ poverty, they use Gonzalez and Rosenberg’s (2006) work: in their data 
institutions are asked to self-report on the percentage of poor borrowers among customers and 
on the percentage of small loans they make. They find that, if the fraction of small loans 
increases by 10%, the self-reported amount of poor clients increases by 9%: this suggests a 
rather strong correlation between smaller loans and greater outreach to the poor.  
As the third item in Table 2 shows, in order to make comparisons across institutions in 
different countries, Cull et al. (2009) consider the average loan size as a percentage of the 
income at the 20th percentile of the income distribution in the given country (they consider the 
average loan given by the MFI divided by the income at the 20th percentile of the distribution 
in the country where the institution is situated). For half of the banks the average loan size is 
more than 224% of per capita household income at the 20th percentile, meaning that their 
average customer gets a loan that is more than twice the income of the poorest fifth of the 
national population. For NGOs, instead, the median average loan size is only 48% (they are 
giving loans that are half the income of poor people). NBFIs are in the middle with a 
percentage of 160%. Moreover, a quarter of banks give an average loan that is more than 5 
times the 20th percentile income. These large loans given by banks demonstrate that their 
customers are substantially better off than NGOs’ clients: nongovernmental organizations are 
more likely to serve the poorest of the country in which they are. So, these results suggest that 
there could be a trade-off between pursuing profits and reaching the very poor. Nevertheless, 
it’s important to remember that the evidence does not come from direct measures, but from 
proxy indicators of customers’ incomes. 
The NGOs of the sample also serve a higher percentage of women: at least 25% of these 
not commercialized institutions serve exclusively women and only one out of four NGOs has 
a percentage of female customers below 63%. On the contrary, 25% of banks serve less than 
23 women every 100 customers and for the median bank women represent 52% of all 
borrowers. Nonbank financial institutions are again in a middle position: for the median NBFI 
female clients represent 66% of all borrowers. In this case, we could also notice that there are 
no data about the number of women asking for a loan to NGOs versus those asking to banks 
and the amount of them approved by the two types of institutions: the difference between the 
capability of the two types of institutions in reaching female customers could be given by the 
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refusal of banks to serve women (maybe because they are very poor and could ask for very 
little loans), but also by the fact that women prefer turning to NGOs rather than to banks. 
 
 
1.5  Portfolio at risk: are all customers able to repay their loans? 
In order to study the risk of insolvency, Cull et al. (2009) consider three different lending 
methods: individual, solidarity group and village bank. Individual lending consists in the 
usual lending relationship between the bank and individual customers; this method is usually 
applied in growing markets with larger loan size. In fact, two thirds of the banks in the sample 
lend through this method. Solidarity groups are appropriate for poorer households: they are 
group contracts (made famous by Grameen Bank) in which customers are asked to associate 
into small groups and are required to guarantee all other members’ loan repayments. In this 
way the MFI can ensure that clients’ incentives are aligned. Usually, when a person of the 
group defaults, the entire group is denied access to future loans. Also “village banks” are 
based on group responsibility for loan repayments: this method is generally applied to serve 
the poorest customers, the ones so costly to reach that are usually excluded from any other 
form of financial services. In the sample 75% of NGOs lend through one of these two group 
methods. 
The interesting result from the dataset is that the lending method, notwithstanding the 
different targets associated, doesn’t seem to affect the repayment of the loan. In order to 
appreciate the risk of insolvency, Cull et al. (2009) consider the percentage of outstanding 
balance of loans for which installments are more than 30 days overdue on the total value of 
loans outstanding. Referring to the fifth item in Table 2, banks are slightly less at risk than 
NGOs: for the median bank 2.43% of the total value of loans is more than 30 days overdue, 
while for the median NGO the percentage rises to 3.54% (an important specification is that 
data about banks are based on fewer than 10 observations). Obviously this is a static analysis: 
the data cannot reveal what would happen to loan repayment rates if an institution suddenly 
switched to a different lending method. So, the measures suggest that, although loans may not 
be repaid in full, the risk of insolvency is kept under control by all types of institutions. This 
result confirms the great achievement that is acknowledged to microfinance: microfinance 
demonstrates that poor “unbankable” customers are actually able to pay back their loans, even 
in the absence of collateral.  
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2. Financial sustainability of microfinance institutions 
In the first chapter microfinance institutions and their customers have been analyzed, finding 
remarkable differences between banks and nongovernmental organizations. This second 
chapter will deal with the financial self-sufficiency of MFIs, with a particular focus on 
profitability, subsidies and the possibility of attracting private investors. The important results 
that nonprofit organizations demonstrate also in the financial field will bring to the conclusion 
that commercialized institutions cannot completely substitute social organizations in the 
future of microfinance. 
 
 
2.1 Profitability of for-profit versus nonprofit microfinance institutions 
We could expect that commercial organizations seeking for profits have higher profitability 
than nonprofit organizations pursuing social goals. This trend is confirmed in Figure 2, based 
on a sample taken from the MicroBanking Bulletin (2005). 
 
 
Figure 2. Profitability versus noncommercial funding 
Source: Cull et al. (2009) 
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Profitability is the institution’s ability to generate sufficient revenues to cover its costs, with 
no need for subsidies; it is indicated on the vertical axis by the financial self-sufficiency ratio 
(if it is below 1, the institution needs subsidies). In order to understand whether an 
organization is commercialized, the horizontal axis gives the “noncommercial funding ratio” 
(the sum of donations plus noncommercial borrowing plus equity, divided by total funds): 
when it is zero, funding comes exclusively from deposits and commercial borrowing; when it 
is one, the institution is fully dependent on donations, borrowing at below market rates or 
equity. The quadratic fit confirms the logical intuition: there is a link (although weak) 
between higher profitability and smaller reliance on donations and noncommercial funding. 
The scatter plot of data points is also very interesting: each point represents a 
microfinance institution (empty circles stand for nonprofit organizations; solid circles 
represent for-profits). What banks and commercial MFIs are searching for is to be in the 
north-west area of the graph with high profitability and low reliance on donations. So, the for-
profits tend to cluster in this zone; on the other hand, nonprofit organizations can be found in 
every part of the graph, including the profitable range. Nonprofits can be so successful thanks 
to social investors, such as international financial institutions (e.g. the World Bank’s 
International Finance Corporation) or individuals who invest small amounts of money asking 
no financial return. These social investors and the subsidies they permit access to are really 
important for the future of nonprofits. 
Going more in depth in the analysis of the sample taken from the MicroBanking Bulletin, 
as Table 3 shows, banks are more likely to be profitable (self-sufficiency ratio higher than 1) 
than others: 73% of institutions are profitable and about 3.7 million out of 4.1 million bank 
customers are served by profitable banks. On the other hand, profitable NGOs serve 8 million 
customers, twice the number of profitable banks. However, a notable remark is that the 
sample is mainly composed of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs are 148, more than 
four times banks) and some of them are really large: the immediate implication is that 
profitable NGOs can serve more clients than profitable banks. About nonbank financial 
institutions, 60% of them are profitable, but they serve the lowest amount of customers 
overall and on a profitable basis: they have 2.6 million customers and only 75% of them 
(about 2 million) are served by profitable NBFIs. Overall, 57% of MFIs in the sample are 
profitable and they serve 14 million clients out of 16.1 million. This analysis about 
profitability reiterates that nonprofit nongovernmental organizations are not marginal: they 
serve more borrowers overall and on a profit-making basis. 
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Table 3. Profitability of microfinance institutions 
 Institutions Active borrowers 
 Number in sample 
Percent 
profitable 
Number in 
sample 
(million) 
Percent served 
by profitable 
institutions 
Institution type     
Bank 30 73% 4.1 92% 
Nongovernmental 
organizations 148 54% 8.9 91% 
Nonbank 
financial 
institutions 
94 60% 2.6 75% 
Credit union 30 53% 0.5 57% 
Total 302 57% 16.1 87% 
Source: Cull et al. (2009) 
 
 
2.2 Private investors: could they be attracted by this level of profits? 
In the sample taken from the MicroBanking Bulletin, 57% of MFIs are profitable; this is a 
good result, but it also means that there are still lots of unprofitable institutions. In addition to 
this, Cull et al. (2009) analyze the profitability of institutions in the dataset from the MIX. As 
shown in Table 4, at the 25th percentile NGOs’ self-sufficiency ratio falls to 0.78, against 0.99 
of banks and 0.86 of NBFIs. This demonstrates that a quarter of NGOs cannot autonomously 
cover a large part of their costs. But an indicator of profitability that private investors usually 
look at is the Return On Equity: the ROE of MFIs in the sample is very various. 25% of 
NGOs and NBFIs have a negative return on equity (below -10.5 for NGOs and -7.9 for 
NBFIs). The median of both these types of institutions has a ROE higher than 3%. At the 75th 
percentile, NGOs reach a ROE of 13.8%, while nonbank financial institutions have a return 
on equity of 17.8%. Banks have the best performance: the median bank has a ROE of 10%, 
while a quarter of the banks in the sample have a ROE higher than 22.9%. Considering only 
profitable institutions, things become better: the median profitable NGO still has the lowest 
return on equity (11.4%), but the median profitable NBFI has a ROE of 14.4% and the 
median profitable bank has a ROE of 15.1%. The real question is to understand whether these 
returns are high enough to attract private investors who have no concerns with social impact. 
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Although these figures are impressive, the majority of MFIs cannot be appealing for profit-
maximizing investors. As a term of comparison, Cull et al. (2009) use Banco Compartamos of 
Mexico: in 2004 (three years before its IPO) it had a ROE of above 50%. This suggests that 
only the best-performing microfinance institutions could attract private investors; the majority 
of organizations, on the contrary, should continue relying on social investors.  
 
Table 4. Financial results and funding of different institutions 
 Nongovernmental organizations 
Nonbank financial 
institutions Banks 
 
For 
different 
percentiles 
for this 
variable 
Median if 
profitable 
For 
different 
percentiles 
for this 
variable 
Median if 
profitable 
For 
different 
percentiles 
for this 
variable 
Median if 
profitable 
1) Financial 
self-sufficiency 
ratio 
      
25th 0.78  0.86  0.99  
Median 1.03 1.14 1.04 1.16 1.04 1.10 
75th 1.17  1.22  1.15  
2) Return on 
equity (%)       
25th -10.5  -7.9  1.6  
Median 3.4 11.4 3.6 14.4 10.0 15.1 
75th 13.8  17.8  22.9  
3) Subsidy per 
borrower 
(PPP$) 
      
25th 72  0  0  
Median 233 199 32 8 0 0 
75th 659  747  136  
Source: Cull et al. (2009) 
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2.3 The relevance of subsidies and composition of funding across microfinance 
institutions 
In the analysis of MIX data, subsidies have been evaluated as subsidy per borrower in 
purchasing power parity equivalents (see the third item in Table 4). Nongovernmental 
organizations are the ones absorbing the greatest amount of subsidies: the median NGO 
receives $233 per borrower and a quarter of NGOs receive subsidies per borrower greater 
than $659. Half of the banks, on the contrary, receive no subsidy at all. Nonbank financial 
institutions are, as usual, in a middle range: a quarter of them receive no subsidy, while the 
median NBFI absorbs $32 per borrower and at the 75th percentile they are even more 
subsidized than NGOs with $747 per borrower. Also conditioning on profitability, things are 
exactly what we could expect according to the previous analysis of the outreach to poor 
customers: the median profitable bank uses no subsidy while the median profitable 
nongovernmental organization needs a subsidy per borrower of $199 (slightly lower than the 
median NGO when unprofitable organizations are included). So, although there are many 
profitable NGOs, the subsidization still plays a notable role also for profit-making 
nongovernmental organizations. 
Cull et al. (2009) go a step further into the analysis of the sample, reasoning on the 
types of funding and their shares in different institutions: they find that, on average, only 16% 
of the total funding of banks is given by noncommercial funds (donations, equity, borrowing 
at below-market interest rates) against the average of 63% of nongovernmental organizations.  
So, NGOs do have higher operating costs- as demonstrated in the previous chapter- and do 
need greater subsidization than commercialized organizations. This does not necessarily 
imply a reduction in efficiency, as stated by the supporters of the profit-driven model of 
microfinance. Many nonprofit organizations will need the economic support of social 
investors also in the future in order to face the costs to reach the very poor: proving the broad 
impact that microfinance can have on social outcomes is crucial to ensure their economic 
support. 
 
 
2.4 The future of microfinance: the false choice between the profit-seeking and social-
driven models and their development 
At the end of 2006 microfinance customers were 133 million (Daley-Harris, 2007); even if 
only one person per family gets a loan, the entire family will be positively affected. 
Considering the average family as composed of 5 members, about 665 million poor and low-
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income people were reached by microfinance worldwide. There is no doubt that these figures 
will continue growing in the future and microfinance will expand further. But using which of 
the two models? Is the profit-driven model the only way to the future? Cull et al. (2009) don’t 
believe that commercialization can be embraced as the single way to the future: their analysis 
shows that nonprofit nongovernmental organizations play an essential role in serving the very 
poor, especially women, that cannot be completely replaced by commercial banks. Social-
driven institutions like NGOs are still indispensable to the cause of microfinance; the two 
models can survive together. In general, Cull et al. (2009) see the private sector as capable of 
innovating, growing and adapting; this brings benefits to low-income people (even if not the 
poorest) and it is anyway important to contribute to demolish barriers to financial access. 
Moreover, commercial banks are essential tools of savings: by taking deposits, they not only 
ensure themselves funds for the loan activity, but they also give customers a safe way to 
accumulate.  
An interesting challenge for the future of both commercialized and social 
microfinance institutions will be finding ways to reduce costs of financial transactions (above 
all, to keep expenses for managing small deposits low). Technology could result very helpful 
in this: mobile banking, for example, can reduce costs, increment efficiency and increase the 
quality of services even in poor communities; it is showing first successes in the Philippines, 
South Africa and Kenya. Obviously, to harness the potential of technology and make it reach 
also very poor villages, large investments on new infrastructure (such as electricity and 
coverage) are needed. MFIs should not underestimate the risks connected to the development 
of such innovations. 
Probably, in the future, microfinance should rethink the principles of lending: today 
microcredit focuses mainly on funding small businesses which need cash, but the demand for 
loans goes beyond this urgency. Loans are often asked for other reasons, like paying for 
school fees or coping with health emergencies. Johnston and Morduch (2008), for example, 
find that 50% of recent loans given to poor households in Indonesia were not used for 
purposes related to business. In addition, Rutherford (2006) studies a sample of Grameen 
Bank borrowers, observing that many loans, although labeled as business loans, were used for 
different purposes. 
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3. The original social mission: Yunus and his idea 
The main problem about commercialization highlighted in the analysis of the previous 
chapters is the decline of the original social mission intrinsic to microfinance: Yunus came up 
with the idea of microfinance to help the very poor, after having talked with them and having 
touched with hands their needs and problems. It was a bottom-up process, that, from local 
projects and experiments, resulted in the foundation of an autonomous bank under a special 
law: the Grameen Bank. In this chapter the whole process will be summarized, focusing on 
the effectiveness of microfinance in reaching its social goals. But Yunus’s idea is not confined 
into the boundaries of microfinance: today more and more private companies with explicit 
social missions are arising and the eventuality of earning profits while positively impacting 
the society seems always more desirable.  
 
 
3.1 Yunus’s first attempts: finding out the poverty cycle and the solution to break it 
Muhammad Yunus was born in Chittagong (Bangladesh) in 1940; he graduated at Chittagong 
University and, after a Ph. D at the University of Vanderbilt in Nashville (US), he started 
teaching at Middle Tennessee University. After the Bangladesh Liberation War from Pakistan 
(1971), he returned to Bangladesh and he became head of the Economics Department at 
Chittagong University.  
The War of Liberation and a devastating series of natural disasters in those years 
caused a terrible famine in Bangladesh: Yunus was perturbed by this and in 1974 he started 
acting. What shocked him the most was the fact that, while people died of starvation, fields 
around the university were not cultivated: so, he created a program called CURDP 
(Chittagong University Rural Development Project) through which he encouraged students to 
go with him into the village and find ways to improve day-to-day life. 
In 1975, in order to alleviate hunger, he focused his attention on solving the problem 
of irrigation to raise an additional crop in Jobra (a village near the Chittagong University) 
during the winter unproductive dry season. He called a meeting of local farmers and 
sharecroppers to propose a new type of agricultural cooperative called the Nabajug (New Era) 
Three Share Farm: during the dry season, landowners would let sharecroppers cultivate their 
land, using tube-well, seeds, fertilizer and technical know-how provided by Yunus. In 
exchange each of the three parties would share one third of the harvest. The project, although 
some farmers gave Yunus less than agreed (causing him a loss), achieved its goal: rice was 
cultivated and harvested during the normally unproductive season. But following all phases of 
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agricultural production during this experiment, Yunus understood that sharecroppers were not 
the poorest and, in turn, they were exploiting poorer people, as destitute women who separate 
the rice from the dry straw ten hours a day for 40 cents. He realized that his recent project had 
only made things worse for these women. At this point, it was important to distinguish 
between the very poor and the marginal farmers: the wealthier the farmer (the more he earned 
from the project), the smaller was the share of the exploited very poor. This convinced him to 
address only the poorest in his future programs, otherwise the non-poor would reap all the 
benefits.  
Yunus started analyzing the life of the landless poor (day laborers, craft workers or 
beggars) in order to go at the root of the problem. He talked to women who threshed rice or 
made bamboo stools and he understood the problem was not the lack of effort (they were 
really hard workers), but their lack of cash to buy the raw materials: this forced them to buy 
raw materials from the usurer and sell back the final products to him, earning not more than 
what was sufficient to keep them alive. In this way the cycle of poverty was almost 
impossible to end. But there was a way: lending people the small amount of money they 
needed for the raw materials so that they could sell their handicrafts at fair prices. At this 
point, Yunus felt the urgency to create an institutional answer for these people to rely on: he 
went to Janata Bank, a government bank located in the Campus University and one of the 
largest in the country. After talking to the local and regional managers, he managed to 
convince them to borrow to poor illiterate people if there was a guarantor, Yunus himself, to 
act on behalf of the borrowers. After six months, in December 1976, Yunus succeeded in 
taking out a loan from the Janata Bank and giving it to the poor of Jobra.  More than 98% of 
the loans were repaid: the poor knew this was their only chance to break the poverty circle. 
 
 
3.2 The arduous birth of Grameen Bank and its mode of operation 
Although this success, traditional bankers did not change their mind about lending to the 
poor: they still believed the poor were not credit-worthy, since they had no credit history or 
collateral to offer and, being illiterate, they could not even fill out the necessary paperwork. 
Moreover, they were not interested in such tiny loans. Finally, in 1977, the managing director 
of the Bangladesh Krishi (Agriculture) Bank agreed to have a special bank branch created in 
Jobra to test the idea of lending to the poor: this project was called the Experimental Grameen 
(which means “of the village”) Branch of the Agricultural Bank. In order not to force the poor 
to deal with large sums, Yunus decided to institute a daily payment program, soon substituted 
by a weekly one, trying to keep each procedure as simple as possible. Yunus and his 
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collaborators (among whom many students) also discovered the importance of support 
groups: group membership creates support and a sense of intragroup and intergroup 
competition. Association should be spontaneous and when 5 poor people have formed a 
group, they can request a loan to the Grameen Branch. After that, prospective borrowers must 
participate in a training about the duties and responsibilities of a Grameen Bank’s member of 
at least 7 days with a final individual test; if only one of the 5 doesn’t pass the test, the entire 
group cannot obtain the loan. Today the procedure is still the same and it is summarized in the 
Grameen Guidelines. If an individual is unable or unwilling to pay back the loan, the group 
could become ineligible for larger loans in subsequent years until the repayment problem is 
brought under control. 
Grameen also encourages savings: initially all borrowers were required to deposit 5% 
of each loan in a group fund; any borrower could take an interest free loan from the group 
fund (not more than half of it), given all the other members’ approval (then, under Grameen 
II, group fund will be replaced by individual savings). About clients, this experimental project 
had a particular goal: at least 50% of customers should be women. There are several 
explanations for this: first of all, women were almost completely excluded by the traditional 
banking system; secondly, lending to women brings more benefits to the entire family. In fact, 
while men are usually focused on themselves, women focus on their children and the 
household, bringing more welfare to the entire family. But, integrating women in the project 
was very difficult, because of socio-cultural customs and religious beliefs. It took more than 6 
years to achieve the goal. Also in this case, repayment rates were nearly perfect. 
In 1979, the Central Bank promoted the expansion of the experiment: Yunus joined 
the two-year Grameen Bank Project in the District of Tangail. The objective was to 
demonstrate that the success of Grameen Bank was not due to Yunus’s personality, reputation 
and personal involvement, but was replicable on a large scale. At the end of this second 
experiment, managing directors of the Central Bank were not convinced yet. Yunus made 
another proposal to demonstrate it: the experiment would have been extended to five very 
poor areas on a national level, with no costs for the Central Bank. He obtained a guarantee 
fund of $800,000 from Ford Foundation and a loan of $3.4 million from the International 
Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), based in Rome. In 1982 the expansion program 
started. But this was not enough: in 1983 Yunus, thanks to the Ministry of Finance Muhith, 
managed to convert the project into an autonomous bank under a separate law created 
especially for the purpose: Grameen Bank, the bank for the poor, was born.  
During the 1980s, Grameen expansion program created approximately 100 new 
branches every year. Responsibility for setting up new local branches is given to young 
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managers. These new young workers receive on-the-job-training: they have a two-day 
briefing and then they go to various branches to observe the reality of Grameen for 6 months. 
In this way they are immersed in the culture of the poor, learning how to appreciate the 
unexplored potential of the destitute. At the end of the period of training, they have a debate 
to criticize what they have seen in the branches and to make their own proposal of 
improvement. Afterwards, each of them chooses the general location of the future office; they 
have to draw a map of the area and write reports on the village’s history, culture, economy 
and poverty situation; then, they organize a “projection meeting” inviting all the people in 
nearby villages, including village leaders, religious leaders, teachers and government officials. 
The meeting aims at explaining Grameen’s procedure and regulations in detail: then the 
village chooses whether to accept the presence of this bank on its territory or not. At first, 
convincing people to trust Grameen can be an arduous battle. 
Yunus’s idea had been inspiring for many new projects outside Bangladesh in both 
developing countries (such as Malaysia and the Philippines) and developed ones (such as in 
US- the Good Faith Fund in Arkansas and the Lakota Fund in South Dakota are some 
examples- and in Europe- e.g. in Poland and Norway, where microcredit was promoted as a 
tool for social integration and an effective means of giving new meaning to people’s lives). 
In 2001 Grameen Bank launched a program to convert its operational methodology 
into a newer version called the Grameen Generalized System (or Grameen Bank II): the main 
innovations are the possibility of getting flexible loans, a pension savings account and a loan 
insurance program in the eventuality the borrower dies. Today Grameen Bank is self-reliant, 
receiving no donation: all loans are paid using deposits. Ever since it came into being, it has 
made profit every year (except in 1983, 1991, and 1992), but it is not a commercial bank; 
borrowers own 94% of the bank, the government the remaining 6%. It has 2,568 branches in 
81,392 villages, with a total of 8.8 million members (96.5% of which are women). Since 
inception, it has disbursed $19 million with a repayment rate of 98%, providing not only 
microenterprise loans, but also housing loans (697,395 houses were built thanks to these 
loans), education loans (helping 53,453 students) and others. Each borrower has a savings 
account and every year the bank’s profits are returned to the borrowers in the form of 
dividends. Since its foundation, Grameen Bank continued fighting against poverty trying to 
answer to all needs and shortages of the poor through new Grameen Companies. Today the 
Grameen Family is made up of 25 Grameen Companies, each of them with a specific goal, as 
reported in Table 5.  
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Table 5. Grameen Companies 
Company Name Founded Purpose 
Grameen Bank 1983 Financial services for the poor 
Grameen Trust 1989 Training, technical assistance, and financial 
support for MFIs around the world 
Grameen Krishi 
(Agriculture) Foundation 
1991 Experimentation and training to improve 
agricultural practices and output 
Grameen Uddog 
(Enterprise) 
1994 Export of Grameen Check hand-loom fabrics 
Grameen Fund 1994 Social venture capital funding for 
entrepreneurial start-ups 
Grameen Motsho O 
Pashusampad (Fisheries 
and Livestock) 
Foundation 
1994 Fish pond and livestock breeding programs 
Grameen Telecom 1995 Telecommunications services for the poor 
Grameen Shamogree 
(Products) 
1996 Domestic sales of Grameen Check hand-loom 
fabrics, handicrafts and products 
Grameen Cybernet 1996 Internet service provider 
Grameen Shakti (Energy) 1996 Renewable energy sources for rural Bangladesh 
Grameen Phone 1996 Cell-phone service 
Grameen Kalyan 
(Welfare) 
1996 Health and welfare services for members and 
staff of Grameen Bank 
Grameen Shikkha 
(Education) 
1997 Scholarship and other assistance to students of 
poor families 
Grameen 
Communications 
1997 Internet service provider and data processing 
services 
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Grameen Knitwear 1997 Manufacture of knitted fabrics for export 
Grameen Capital 
Management 
1998 Investment Management 
Grameen Solutions 1999 Development of IT solutions for business 
Grameen IT Park 2001 Development of high-tech office facilities in 
Dhaka 
Grameen Byabosa Bikash 
(Business Promotion) 
2001 Provision of small business loan guarantees 
Grameen Information 
Highway Ltd. 
2001 Data connectivity and Internet access provider 
Grameen Star Education 2002 Information technology training 
Grameen Bitek 2002 Manufacture of electronic products 
Grameen Helthcare Trust 2006 Funding for Grameen Health Care Services 
Grameen Healthcare 
Services 
2006 Health care services for the poor 
Grameen Danone 2006 Affordable, nutritious foods for the poor 
Grameen Veolia 2008 Safe drinking water for Bangladeshi villages 
Source: Yunus, Muhammad, and Karl Weber. Creating a World without Poverty: Social Business and 
the Future of Capitalism. New York: PublicAffairs, 2007 
 
 
3.3 Poverty reduction: is the social mission achieved? 
Not everyone agrees that microfinance is capable of improving the poor’s conditions. 
Bateman and Chang (2012), for example, even affirm that microfinance can make things 
worse, since, supporting microenterprises, it goes against the concept of efficiency deriving 
from economies of scale, it causes de-industrialization of the local economy and it fails to 
connect with the rest of the enterprise sector. Many others, such as Armendáriz de Aghion and 
Morduch (2005) and World Bank (2007), consider inconclusive the results of the existing 
studies on the effect of microfinance on global poverty. In his work, Beck (2015) shows 
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moderate but not transformative effects of microcredit, with outcomes being conditional on 
individuals’ characteristics. In general, critics often argue that microcredit does not contribute 
to the economic development of a country. But it all depends on the definition of this 
development: effective results on aggregate figures could be hard to find, but the immediate 
benefits in the poor’s lives are rather evident in the majority of the cases.   
Many microfinance organizations (such as SHARE in India, CARD in the Philippines 
and LAPO in Nigeria) report evidence of material change about food, water and housing: poor 
people experience fewer months of food shortage, eat more nutritious food and can improve 
the size of house and the durability of materials. They also report evidence of a positive 
cognitive change, with more people knowing how to read and /or write and experiencing more 
self-esteem and confidence about the future. Improvements have been seen also in group 
dynamics (e.g. more trust, more use of discussion and consensus to take group decisions), 
community participation and participation in politics. As an example, Yunus reports that in 
1997 over 1,750 Grameen members (1,485 women and 268 men) and 1,570 members of 
Grameen borrowers’ families were elected to local offices in Bangladesh. These 
achievements demonstrate how poor people can escape social alienation and, thanks to the re-
gained self-esteem, they can express their opinion and actively participate in the life of their 
State. 
In addition, microfinance can really produce positive behavioral changes. First of all, 
the life of poor women (who are the main target of socially oriented organizations) can be 
improved: especially in developing countries, women can be subjected to many forms of 
violence, among which economic violence. World Bank (2015) defines economic violence on 
two levels: “acts perpetrated by systems and structures, as well as by individuals. At the 
interpersonal level, economic abuse is defined as making or attempting to make an individual 
financially dependent by maintaining total control over financial resources, withholding one's 
access to money, or forbidding one's attendance at school or employment. At the structural 
and institutional level, women might experience economic violence as limited access to funds 
and credit; controlling access to health care, employment, or education; discriminatory 
traditional laws on inheritance and property rights; and unequal remuneration for work.” 
Microfinance is aimed at eliminating economic violence. Moreover, if it is connected to 
empowerment initiatives, microfinance can be particularly useful in reducing also intimate 
partner violence against women (an example is given by the IMAGE “Sisters in life” Study in 
South Africa). Furthermore, after having increased their incomes through self-employment, 
Grameen female borrowers show a remarkable determination to have fewer children and 
educate the ones they have. 
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Microfinance institutions can also educate clients, facilitate access to public and 
private providers, provide health financing options (such as loans and savings) and even 
directly deliver clinical care. This improves the health of poor borrowers. According to 
Leatherman et al. (2010), in Dominican Republic, South Africa and Bangladesh the impact of 
microfinance combined with health education has proven to have positive results in 
reproductive health, preventive and primary health care for children, child nutrition, 
breastfeeding, child diarrhea, HIV prevention, sexually transmitted disease and malaria. 
Furthermore, Odell (2015) shows preliminary findings about the increase in the use of health 
care due to basic health insurance products.     
Ayyagari et al. (2016), using two complementary datasets, are the first to formally 
establish that increased access to finance results in increased job growth in developing 
countries, especially among micro, small and medium enterprises. 
These results, although they are mainly self-reported by the organizations that have 
achieved them, are certainly meaningful and cannot be ignored: microfinance is giving a 
concrete help in improving the poor’s lives.  
 
 
3.4 Business and social mission beyond microfinance: the social company  
Yunus’s idea of microfinance is a great example of a player in a “new sector” of the economy: 
the social-consciousness-driven private sector. Social companies are private-owned 
companies that have a social impact: they are a new category of entrepreneurs and financiers 
who have taken a different approach in the last few years, showing that it is possible to create 
social wellbeing and make a profit. They are different from both profit-maximizing 
companies and donation-dependent nonprofits. In this perspective, a new model of for-profit 
corporation was legally created: the Benefit Corporation. The main difference from the other 
types of companies is in its double bottom line: the B-Corporation must not only return profits 
to shareholders, but it is also obliged to pursue public benefits. Stecker (2016) even talks 
about a “triple bottom-line”, related to people, planet and profits. This new business structure 
is fundamental for empowering socially-oriented commercial organizations. The values of 
shareholders will give the company its moral legitimacy.  
Today social companies can act to solve the problems of both developed and 
developing countries. Government of developed countries are going to face enormous 
difficulties as the population gets old (more retired people, larger needs for health assistance, 
fewer young working people) and the market saturates; social companies can help in 
addressing these challenges through new and innovative approaches. First of all, they can 
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substitute the government in providing public goods efficiently and profitably. An example is 
given by the Centro Medico Sant’Agostino, in Italy: it is a completely private organization 
and it is capable of offering high-quality and efficient health care services, at the same price 
(sometimes even lower) of public health care structures. Its main partner is Oltre Venture: it is 
the first Italian social venture capital which helps creative entrepreneurs realizing their project 
through impact investing. Social impact investing consists in providing finance to 
organizations which are trying to give an answer to social needs with the explicit expectation 
of a measurable social (as well as financial) return. This is a second way of answering the 
needs of developed economies: new businesses, enterprises and organizations are a very 
strong regenerating force, capable of effectively fighting unemployment and creating a 
prosperous economy.  
Another interesting tool for helping people through private enterprises is given by the 
“social impact bond” (SIB), a form of payment by results. In a SIB, companies with a social 
mission receive funding from private investors to make actions in order to produce social 
outcomes. If these programs actually produce better social conditions, it results in savings to 
government (which must not give services to needy individuals): part of these savings will be 
given back to the investors. So, as an example, the government will pay for every person the 
company manages to keep out of prison, for every child it enrolls at school or for every 
homeless person that it houses, but it will spend nothing for unsuccessful projects: the risk of 
social results is shifted to private investors, while the government bears no risk. A great 
model is given by MHSA (Massachusetts Housing and Shelter Alliance) Boston, which is an 
independent nonprofit organization dedicated to ending homelessness in Massachusetts. 
On the other hand, in developing countries many people are left out of the market and 
even their basic needs remain unanswered. In this case social companies and commercial 
enterprises which have also social goals are fundamental to take those opportunities that 
profit-driven companies can’t even see. An example is given by Unilever that, collaborating 
with Oxfam, Population Services International (PSI), Save the Children, UNICEF and the 
World Food Programme, is taking concrete action to improve life conditions in destitute 
community in the poorest areas of the world. Many others, such as Danone and Veolia are 
collaborating with social organizations to solve developing countries’ more urgent problems 
and, in addition, more and more organizations which pursue only social goals are arising. A 
mention deserves StreetwiZe mobile school, an organization including 50,000 activities in 
Africa, Asia, South America and Europe. Its objective is to bring a “Mobile School” to street 
children: each school cart has over 300 games designed not only to teach children how to read 
and write, but also to develop their talent in their environment. The project has been financed 
30  
through a business strategy course based on street children’s lives, in which top managers of 
companies such as Ikea and Nike can learn how to take a positive view and make quick and 
effective decisions as street children are able to do.  
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Conclusion 
In this work the microfinance sector has been analyzed, using a dataset from the MIX (data 
refer to the period 2002-2004), comparing commercialized and not commercialized 
institutions: nonprofits are the majority in the sample, they serve more borrowers, more 
women and even more clients on a profitable basis than for-profits, but they have less assets 
and absorb more subsidies; commercialized institutions, on the other hand, serve less poor 
customers, give larger loans, are more likely to be profitable and charge lower interest rates 
(since their loans are larger, their operating costs per dollar spent are lower). Anyway, only 
top institutions with very high ROE could attract private investors. Because of all these 
differences and since half social-driven institutions usually completely recover their costs, 
commercialization of microfinance is a way to the future, but not the only one. On the 
contrary, the social mission that gave birth to microfinance is a really present concern.  
Microfinance was born thanks to Yunus’s idea: he saw poverty in Bangladesh and 
talked to the very poor in order to understand the reasons behind that misery. It was not their 
lack of skills: usually they were hard workers. It was the lack of money to buy raw materials 
for their businesses: all they needed were few dollars to initiate their activities and sell their 
products at fair prices. After several local experiments, the Grameen Bank was founded: it is a 
private institution with the specific social mission of letting people escape poverty. Lots of 
similar microfinance institutions were born all over the world: it seems that they are reaching 
their social goal and many men and women are enjoying better life conditions. This is the 
reason why the “social business model” of microfinance should not succumb. Actually, many 
other social companies are arising for providing public goods or helping disadvantaged people 
in both developed and developing countries.  
This work suggests that it is possible for organizations to focus on a social mission, 
while remaining efficient and even making a conscious profit: it enriches the entire 
community, not just the shareholders. It’s a sustainable way of doing business: it produces 
wealth and, as in the case of microcredit, it can produce new business, with a regenerating 
force that makes the economy prosperous. As people continue to strengthen their social 
conscience, companies driven by social missions will continue to develop and play an 
essential role in the future economies. 
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